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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

ERNEST H. DEAN, et al..
Respondents,
Case No.
~vs-

wsn

CALVIN L. RAMPTON, et al.,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Defendant-Appellants, Calvin L. Rampton, Governor,
Clyde L. Miller, Secretary of State, and Vernon B. Romney,
Attorney General, collectively acting in the capacity of the
Board of Examiners of the State of Utah, and David S. Monson
as Auditor of the State of Utah, appeal from the decision
rendered in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent
for the complaint brought under U.C.A. 63-2-15 as amended*
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Defendants* Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's action for
declaratory judgment and plaintiff's Motion to obtain

the Summary Judgment came on regularly before the Law and
Motion Division of the District Court of Salt Lake County,
Stats of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding, on
January 28, 1976*

The parties submitted their respective

motions upon a stipulated statement of facts and submitted
memoranda in support of their respective motions, and the
court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The
court entered an order consistent with that ruling on
March 10, 1976. The order of the lower court held in essence
that the Board of Examiners is without power to examine and
approve the reimbursement claims for out-of-state travel by
members of the legislature.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment
decision, and petition the Court to vacate the order granting
summary judgment.

Further, appellants seek dismissal of the

action consistent with Article VII, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Utah; and a ruling declaring U.C.A.
63-2-15(3) unconstitutional insofar as it purports to exempt
travel claims of the legislature, legislature committees or
members and employees of the legislative counsel from examination and approval by the Board of Examiners of the State of
Utah.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This statement of facts is based on the factual
allegations contained in plaintiff's complaint filed in the
district court; and to which defendants stipulated.
Plaintiffs in their official capacity as officers or
members of the state legislature traveled to the City of
Phildalphia located in the State of Pennsylvania during the
week of October 6, 1975, where they attended the annual fiveday session of the National Conference of State Legislatures.
In addition, plaintiff Brockbank, in his official capacity as
a member of the Legislature also traveled to the City of New
York located in the State of New York during the week of
October 19# 1975, where he attended the Fifth Annual Legislative Conference on Transportation. None of the plaintiffs
requested nor received prior approval for their travel from
the Director of Finance nor the Board of Examiners but rather,
in accordance with practice sanctioned by Sections 63-2-15
and 36-12-7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and by the policy statement for out-of-state legislative travel adopted by the Legisla
tive Management Committee May 7, 1975, attended the conferences
aforesaid at their own expense with the expectation of reimbursement for their actual and necessary expenses.
Plaintiffs incurred expenses for air-fare,

lodging,

and meals incident to attendance at the national conferences
-3-

whcih were submitted as actual and necessary expenses by the
respective plaintiffs to the Department of Finance for approval
processing, and payment.

The Department of Finance after re-

view and processing of the vouchers submitted by the respective
plaintiffs prepared warrants payable to each of the plaintiffs
to reimburse them for actual and necessary expenses which were
submitted to the defendant Monson.
In accordance with executive practice, the defendant
Monson submitted the warrants of plaintiffs Dean and Rencher
on November 6, 1975, and of plaintiff Brockbank on November 20,
1975, to defendants Rampton, Miller and Romney acting as the
Board of Examiners for approval.

The Board of Examiners re-

fused to approve payment of plaintiffs actual and necessary
expenses because of their failure to comply with the travel
expense system promulgated by the Director of Finance pursuant
to Section 63-2-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, although said
section purports to exempt members of the Legislature from its
requirements, and because of their failure to secure the
advance approval of the Board of Examiners for their out-ofstate travel.
Based upon the refusal and failure of the Board of
Examiners to approve payment of the plaintiffs1 actual and
necessary travel expenses the defendant Monson has refused and
continues to refuse to execute the warrants in payment and
-4_

reimbursement of plaintiffs1 expenses.

A case and controversy

therefore exists between the plaintiffs and the defendants
as to whether the Constitution of Utah and, more specifically,
Article VII, Section 13, permits the Board of Examiners to
review travel expenditures of the Legislature through a system
of prior travel approval and whether the defendants can deny
payment of plaintiffs' actual and necessary travel expenses
because they failed to obtain the prior approval of the Board
of Examiners for their out-of-state travel.
POINT I.
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS HAS THE SOLE
POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO EXAMINE ALL CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE.
The powers of the Board of Examiners are conferred upon
it by Section 13, Article VII, of the Utah Constitution, which
provides:
"Until otherwise provided by law, the
Governor; Secretary of State and Attorney
General shall constitute a Board of State
Prison Commissioners, which Board shall
have supervision of all matters connected
with the State Prison as may be provided by
law. They shall, also, constitute a Board
of Examiners, with power to examine all
claims against the State except salaries or
compensation of officers fixed by law, and
perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against the
State, except for salaries and compensation
of officers fixed by law, shall be passed
upon by the Legislature without having been
considered and acted upon by the said Board
of Examiners." (emphasis added).
-5-

This particular section of our Constitution has been
the subject of interpretation before this Court on numerous
occasions.

In one of the most recent of such cases, Toronto

v. Clyde, 15 Utah 2d. 403, 393tP.2d 795, 796, the court said
in reference to this section of the Constitution:
"The extent of the power conferred upon
Examiners by the language, "...with power to
examine all claims against the State...11, has
been bef6re this court on a number of occasions
since statehood. In the case of Bateman v. Board
of Examiners, we gave extensive consideration of
this problem and reviewed the Utah decisions
dealing with it. Upon the basis of the constitutional language, its background and history, including the decisional law of our state, we concluded that the framers intended to vest in the
constitutional officers—the governor, the secretary of state and the attorney general, who are
elected by and are thus directly responsible to
the people—more than a mere auditing function,
that is, power to examine into the advisability
and necessity of any disbursement or proposed
obligation of the state; and that this has the
effect of giving Examiners general supervisory
power over expenditures by the state government."
(emphasis added.)
From this language it is clear that the Board of Examiners
has very broad general supervisory power over all of the expenditures by the state government.

The question is, however, does

this supervision extend to the Legislature as well?
This Court held in Toronto that statutory provisions
passed by the Legislature are unconstitutional insofar as they
conflict with or attempt to limit the provisions of Article
VII, Section 13.

In particular the Toronto case declared
-6-

provisions of the Finance Act unconstitutional, which vested
in the Governor and the Director of Finance power of approval
over certain expenditures.

These claims or expenditures, the

court observed, were properly subject to approval by the Board
of Examiners.

As a result of the Toronto decision, the

Legislature in 1969 amended Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-2-15
(concerning regulation of travel expenses) to conform to the
constitutional provision requiring the Board of Examiners1
approval of claims against the state.

The statute reads in part:

"63-2-15. Director to regulate travel
expenses of state officers and employees—
Approval by board of examiners.—The director
of finance shall, subject to approval by the
board of examiners adopt rules and regulations
covering travel and travel expenses, both as
to in-state and out-of-state travel, of all
state officers, employees, and officials,
justices of the Supreme Court, district judges
and judges of the juvenile court, and members
of all state boards, councils, commissions, and
committees, whether full-time or part-time.
These rules and regulations shall provide for
a travel expense system based upon:
(1) Per diem rates of payment for subsistence expenses subject to modification of
such rates where justified to meet special
circumstances encountered in official attendance at conferences, conventions, and other
official meetings;
(2)

A mileage allowance; and

(3) Reimbusrement for other travel expenses incurred. No obligation shall be
incured for travel outside of the state without the advance approval of the board of examiners through the director of finance. Such
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approval shall consist of a certification
as to the availability of funds as well as a
review of the necessity and desirability of
such travel. This section shall not apply to
the legislature, its committ€>es, or any
member or employee of same."
The 1969 amendment rewrote this section, inserting the
requirement that the Board of Examiners approve the Director f s
rules and regulations, and substituting the Board for the
Governor in the case of advance approval of travel outside
the state.
While this section purports to exclude the legislature
and its members from its provisions, the basic question remains
whether the Legislature can properly enact such a statute under
the constitution.

In an early decision concerning the con-

stitutional provision for the Board of Examiners, the court commented on the provision itself, and explained the resolution
when a statute conflicts with the constitution.
"The powers conferred upon the board of
examiners, with regard to claims against the
state by the constitutional provision quoted
above, are general and sweeping. The power
would include all claims against the state,
were it not for the exception which excludes
salaries or compensation of officers fixed
by law. An exception of this character may
not be enlarged nor extended by implication.
An exception which specifies the things that
are excepted from a general provision
strengthens the force of the general
provisions of the law. 2 Lewis 1 Sutherland,
Stat. Const. §494. It is an elementary
doctrine that, if there are any provisions
-8-

in a statute which in any way conflict with
a constitutional provision, the Constitution
controls. (emphasis added). State ex rel.
Davis v. Edwards, 33 Utah 243, 93 P. 720, 721.
This case, and in particular this language, was so persuasive that it was quoted in a later Board of Examiner case,
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 P. 434. This Court
has declared Uintah to be the "landmark case" in the line of
decisions relating to the Board of Examiners.

The language

of the court makes it clear that when a state statute conflicts with a provision of the Constitution, the constitutional
provision must prevail.
In the landmark Uintah decision, the court explains at
some length the relative powers of the Legislature to enact
statutes which would limit or change the powers vested in the
Board of Examiners by the Constitution.

In Uintah, a claim

was made to the State Auditor, seeking payment, without first
submitting it to the Board for approval. The claim was not by
the auditor, but to and through him against the state. The
court said:
"If the view is taken that the Legislature
intended to make this claim payable by the auditor without presentation to the board of examiners
then the Legislature attempted to do that which
it had no power or authority to effectuate,
and on this question the language in the case
of State ex rel. v. Edwards, supra, is not
only appropriate, but decisive. The court said:

-9-

'The attempt by the Legislature to
require the Auditor to allow a claim which
by the Constitution must first be approved
by the board of examiners can avail nothing.
The Auditor is bound by the constitutional
provision. The Legislature Is so bound,
and so are we. The Legislature may make
certain evidence conclusive with regard
to a specific matter, but it may not interfere with powers conferred or duties imposed by the Constitution.' (emphasis added.)
(Uintah, Supra at 466-67). See also State v r
Hallock, 20 Nev. 326, 22 P. 123, 124.
Significantly, the court stated the Legislature itself
was limited by the constitutional provision and "had no power
or authority to effectuate" any change that would by-pass the
constitutionally mandated Board of Examiner's approval of claims*
This rationale could conceivably be extended to Section 63-215(3), exempting the Legislature, its committees, or any member
or employee of same from the Board's approval of out-of-state
travel.

It states:
"(3) Reimbursement for other travel expenses
incurred. No obligation shall be incurred for
travel outside of the state without the advance
approval of the board of examiners through the
director of finance. Such approval shall consist
of a certification as to the availability of funds
as well as a review of the necessity and desirability of such travel. This section shall not
apply to the legislature, its committees, or any
member or employee of same."

The language in the Uintah case prohibits the Legislature from
passing such a statutory provision, as it appears to be in
conflict with Article VII, Section 13, and unconstitutional*

-10-

In a more recent case, Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d. 359,
374 P.2d. 516, the court again reviewed the constitutional
provision of Article VII, Section 13. In this case the court
held that although the Board of Examiners' power was extremely
broad, it was not absolute. The Legislature, the court said,
had the final word as to approval of claims against the state,
after the Board of Examiners had reviewed them.
"The provision of Sec. 13 Art. VII, quoted
above, that, "...no claim...shall be passed
upon by the Legislature without having been
considered and acted upon by the said Board of
Examiners plainly indicates that the action of
the Board was not intended to be so final and
absolute as to preclude other action by the
Legislature. We can perceive no other meaning
than that after the Board has performed its
duty of examining and acting upon such claims,
the Legislature may then 'pass upon', i.e.,
exercise its judgment, on them and take such
action as it deems appropriate. Entirely in
harmony with this conclusion are: our statutory provision that 'any person who is aggrieved_by disapproval of such a claim by the
Board /Examiners/ may appeal therefrom to the
legislature'; the prior decisions of this
court that have touched upon the matter; and
the practice which has been followed since
statehood." (Budge, supra at 362).
Thus, the Legislature can act as a quasi appeals board
from the Board of Examiners in regard to a specific claim, and
although the court has held that the Legislature cannot directly
encroach upon the Board of Examiners by enacting statutory
provisions which conflict with the Board's constitutional powers,

-11-

the court has acknowledged that the final determination of
how state funds shall be expended is for the Legislature•

This

is also true with respect to travel expenses of the Legislature
itself.

Thus, even if Section 63-2-15(3) is unconstitutional,

it will not prevent the Legislature from approving their own
expenses on appeal or review, but only after first having
presented them to the Board of Examiners where they will be
examined and treated in a like manner with the claims of every
other state official, officer, or employee.
In Budge, supra, the principle of legislative review
of Board of Examiners decisions makes the case particularly
instructive in the set of facts presently before the court.
The court in that case affirmed an order of the District Court,
which required the Board of Examiners to execute payment of
funds the legislature had appropriated to pay claims against
the state, even though the Board had refused to approve payment of the claim when they reviewed the claim originally.
Thus, in explaining the proper procedure of approving and
settling claims against the State of Utah, the court said:
"We can perceive no other meaning
than that after the Board has performed
its duty of examining and acting upon
such claims, the Legislautre may then
'pass upon' i.e., exercise its judgment upon them and take such action
as it deems appropriate.
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To decide otherwise would produce
the illogical result of turning the
subsequent presentation of claims...
into an empty gesture whose only
purpose wDuld be to rubber-stamp the
action of the Board." Budge, supra at 518.
It is apparent then from Budge, supra, that the Board's
exercise of its power to examine claims against the state is
subject to review by the Legislature, but only after the
Board has passed on the matter, having exercised its original
jurisdiction on all claims against the state.
This stands in resounding contrast to the plaintiff's
argument on these facts, where the legislature is attempting
completely to by-pass the Board, and exempt itself from ever
having the Board examine their claim at all, thereby evading
any review of its own travel expenses and violating the
Board's constitutional mandate. Appellants readily concede
the legislature's right of final review in light of the Budge
decision, but respondents1 refuse to acknowledge the Board
of Examiners' constitutional mandate of original jurisdictional
on all claims against the state. Thus, while Budge is very
instructive, it must be limited to cases where the Board has
had an opportunity to examine a claim.

It cannot be read to

mean that travel expenses of the legislature need not be submitted at all to the Board.
Thus, no matter what the source of a claim against the
State, such as one for travel expenses, it must be submitted
-13-

to the Board for approval.

Significantly, the court stated

in Uintah, supra, the Legislature itself was limited by the
constitutional provision and "had no power or authority to
effectuate" any change that would by-pass the constitutionally
mandated Board of Examiner's approval of claims. This rationale logically extends to the subsequently adopted Section
63-2-15(3) exempting the Legislature, its committees, or any
member or employee of same from the Board's approval of outof-state travel.
POINT II
IT IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY TO
ALLOW THE LEGISLATURE TO CIRCUMVENT
THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS' REVIEW OF
TRAVEL CLAIMS.
While at first glance it may seem awkward to construe
Section 13, Article VII to require the Board to review legislative travel claims, since in the context of Budge, supra, the
Legislature has final authority to review and to accept or
reject such claims against the state, a closer examination of
the situation reveals true merit in having the Board do exactly
that.
Although the Legislature is not likely to question the
advisability of or reject its own valid travel claims, review
by the Board of all claims against the state plays the important
role of a check and balance in the tripartite system of State
government in Utah.
-14-

It is important to distinguish the roles of the countervailing theories of government involved in the present controversy. While separation of powers is a well established
political theory, it is not a doctrine of law.

In the State

of Utah, it only exists to the extent the state constitution
delineates the tripartite system of government. At the same
time, any checks and balances that the framers wrote into the
constitution act as bridges between the separate branches of
government and in theory perform opposite kinds of functions
to that of separation of powers.
To say that one impinges on the other is logically inconsistent, however, because each only exists to the extent the
framers of the constitution desired.

Therefore, for the legis-

lature to attempt to statutorily remove the check and balance
imposed by Article VII, Section 13 of the State Constitution
is not only contradictory to law, but also to the basic theory
of government established by our constitution.
A long cherished tradition in our country is that no man
is above the law. Judges that mete out penalities for infractions of the law are subject to the very law they administer.
Likewise, District courts in this state hear and rule on all
matters that come before them in a manner consistent with their
best judgmemt and in good faith, even though surely there are
occasions they believe they will be overruled or reversed on
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appeal by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, petitioners in
our civil courts do not merely by-pass the district court and
take their claims directly to the Supreme Court. The original
jurisdiction of the district courts is not by-passed on the
basis of an facile assumption of what the Supreme Court will
do on the final review of the claim.
Similiarly, what the ultimate effect of a Board decision
on the legislature cannot be predicted with certainity. Therefore , it might be imputing too much of a self-serving attitude to the legislature to assume that they will simply give
rubber-stamp approval to any disapproved legislative travel
requests on appeal from the Board.

This is particularly true

since it must be remembered the legislature is a body consisting of many highly individualized parts.
Likewise, while it is true that the people are the
final judges of legislative acts, and acts of legislators,
this is more ideatistic than practical*

The people can only

act to remove improvident legislators at election time.
By mandating i:he #oard of Examiners to check all claims
against the state, as they arise, the people have an immediate
check on wasteful uses of their tax money, regardless of by
whom occasioned.
It is therefore an affront to > the citizens of Utah for
the members of the legislature to put themselves above the
-16-

law by attempting to circumvent the constitutional mandate of
Article VII, Section 13. This they do on the basis of a
statute, completely contrary to the state constitution.

This

statute purports to make the legislature the sole reviewers
of their own travel expenses, while the Constitution has explicitely established the Board of Examiners as the reviewer
of such claims.
The legislature, as representatives of the people, acting in good faith, has nothing to fear by having its claims
examined by the Board just as all other officers and officials
of the state do. The legislature has no monopoly on representing the people of the State of Utah as elected officials; the
Board of Examiners is under a similar obligation to perform
its duties in good faith.
POINT III.
THE CONSTITUTION EXEMPTS ONLY
"SALARIES AND COMPENSATION OF
OFFICERS FIXED BY LAW" FROM THE
REQUIREMENT OF REVIEW OF ALL CLAIMS
BY THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS.
Article VII, Section 13 provides for only one exception
to the review by the Board of Examiners of all claims against
the state.

In Uintah, supra, the Utah Supreme Court clearly

explained what that exception was:
"All claims are subject to action
by the board of examiners, except only
claims for "salaries and compensation
of officers fixed by law."(emphasis added).
-17-

The reason for the exception contained in Article VII,
Sec. 13# is clear.

The Legislature in pursuance of its

authority has the sole power to appropriate public funds which
includes the fixing of salaries and compensation of State
officers by law and it is not for the executive nor the judicia
to question the wisdom or the amount of such expenditures.
This exception, however, is quite narrow, and the grant of
authority given to the Board of Examiners by the Constitution
to examine all claims against the state must be given broad
deference. This would, of course, include legislative travel
claims.
The question may arise whether the word "compensation"
in Article VII, Section 13, could be interpreted to mean travel
expenses, and thus allow such expenses to fall under the only
exception.

It therefore must be noted that the Utah Supreme

Court interpreted the meaning of that word in yet another of
these decisions relating to the Board of Examiners.

In

Marioneaux v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 P* 355, the court held
that "salary" and "compensation" are treated as synonymous
and used interchangeably in the Utah Constitution.

Clearly

then, since travel expenses are not part of salary,,they cannot be considered compensation.

Similarly, there are cases

around the country holding that travel expenses are not
-18-

"compensation*"

Among such cases are the following: Opinion

of the Justices, 64 A.2d. 204, 95 N.H. 533; Clark v. Board
of Commissioners of Clark County, 267 N.W. 138, 64 S.D. 417;
and Swartz v. Kingsbury County, 267 N.W. 140, 64 S.D. 422.
Thus, there is no excape from the conclusion that a request for travel expenses by the members of the legislature
is a claim against the state, that it is not "salary or compensation of officers fixed by law", and thus not coming within
that single exception, it is a claim that must be submitted to
the Board of Examiners for its action.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully urge the court to carefully
consider the constitutionally imposed obligation of the Board
of Examiners to examine all claims against the State of Utah.
It appears that had the framers of the constitution intended
the legislature to be exempt from such a mandate, they would
have made the specific exception.

Since they did not do so,

the overwhelming conclusion must be reached that the legisla-*
tures• attempt to exempt themselves through U.C.A. 6-2-15(3)
must be considered unconstitutional and therefore null and void.
Defendants1 likewise submit that such review of legislative travel claims by the Board does not constitute any encroachment upon the constitutional powers of the legislative
branch of government.

Rather, the review simply performs the
-19-

healthy function of a check and balance in our tripartite
system of state government.

Separation of powers will thus

be maintained in precisely the same measure as was ordained
by the authors of the state's fundamental law.

Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

PAUL M. TINKER
Assistant Attorney General
C E R T I F I C A T E
Delivered a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
to Melvin E. Leslie, George M. Mecham, and Gary E. Atkin,
attorneys for plaintiff, Room 403# State Capitol, this
/x
day of May, 1976.

\o

A,

Secretary
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